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By integrating signaling research with an institutional perspective we examine how country of 
origin, corporate governance, and host market effects impact foreign IPO performance.  Using a 
sample of 202 foreign IPOs listed in the U.S. or U.K in 2002-2007 results indicate both the legal 
environment surrounding these organizations in their countries of origin and board independence 
impact the success of foreign firms at IPO.  However, the institutional environment of the chosen 
IPO market impacts the salience of country and corporate governance signals for foreign IPO 
firms suggesting a more contextualized framework of IPO valuation is necessary.  
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1. Executive Summary 
An increasing number of foreign private firms are choosing to bypass local exchanges in 
favor of making their first equity offers outside their country of origin (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 2006).  In 2006 foreign companies accounted for 23.4% of IPO proceeds on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and non-British firms raised $22.7 billion through initial public 
offers on the London Stock Exchange in 2007.  Few studies focus on these unique “threshold” 
firms (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004) to investigate the manner in which institutional factors can 
impact the benefits of international listings (Bell, Moore, and Al-Shammari, 2008; Hursti and 
Maula, 2007; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006; Davenport, Dolan, and Hayashi, 2006).  
Our investigation adds to the growing body of research of foreign IPO firms by 
demonstrating the importance of three important drivers of IPO valuation, which can 
significantly impact their financing strategies.  These are country of origin, governance, and 
market choice effects.  Our hypotheses are tested on a hand-collected sample of 202 foreign 
private firms that made their first public equity offerings on either US or UK stock exchanges 
between the years 2002-2007.  In support of our hypotheses, we find that country of origin, 
corporate governance, and market choice have direct and interaction effects on IPO performance. 
By integrating signaling research with institutional perspectives, we extend the growing 
body of research investigating foreign private firms at IPO in entrepreneurship literature (Bell, 
Moore, and Al-Shammari, 2008; Hursti and Maula, 2007).  Previous IPO studies recognize 
potential signaling effects of the firm’s governance characteristics (Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev 
and Bishop, 2002; Sanders and Boivie, 2004) and demonstrate how corporate governance 
characteristics can reduce informational asymmetries and affect IPO performance (e.g., Certo et 
al, 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  However, because extant 
research has predominantly centered upon domestic IPOs listing on local stock exchanges there 
is very little understanding of the role of governance in foreign IPO performance.  We extend 
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this research to assert the legal environment surrounding foreign private firms at IPO is 
especially salient to Western investors because it relates to the degree in which minority 
shareholder rights will be upheld.  Governance mechanisms include not only a country’s laws 
and the regulatory institutions that enforce the laws but also formal and informal monitors of 
corporations (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson, 2007).  For example, independent directors 
serve as an important mechanism which can reduce investor uncertainties and demonstrate to 
investors that a foreign IPO intends to break away from the governance model of the firm’s 
home country.  
Yet, while investors may indeed reference home country and corporate governance cues, 
we find the importance of these signals depend upon the institutional and regulatory traditions of 
its chosen country of listing.  Therefore, we incorporate the regulatory institutional contexts in 
which investors are conducting their evaluation (i.e., “host country effects”) is especially 
important to IPO performance.  Consequently, we assert the informal “gentlemanly capitalism” 
(e.g., Cain and Hopkins, 1986; 1993) regulatory framework of the U.K. capital market may 
prompt U.K. investors to attach relatively higher weight to monitoring-related governance 
practices compared to the more formal regulatory framework inherent to the U.S. capital market.   
Unlike much of the prior research that has focused on mature firms in North America, 
this research clearly shows that board independence and investor protection can have a 
significant effect on performance.  However, results also confirm that national institutional 
settings affect the relative significance of country of origin and corporate governance signals of 
foreign IPOs.  Therefore, we discuss these findings and suggest a number of implications for 






 Recently, the growth in international capital market integration has enabled an increasing 
number of firms to bypass local exchanges in favor of making their first equity offers outside 
their country of origin (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006).  According to Thomson Financial, in 
2006 foreign companies accounted for 23.4% of IPO proceeds on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).  The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations system 
(NASDAQ) also raised over $38.3billion.  Likewise, non-British companies raised $22.7 billion 
through initial public offers on the London Stock Exchange in 2007.  While growing research is 
devoted to the study foreign IPOs, little attention has been devoted to the institutional factors 
which impact the benefits of international listings (Bell, Moore, and Al-Shammari, 2008; Hursti 
and Maula, 2007; Davenport, Dolan, and Hayashi, 2000; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006).  To 
address this, we examine how three drivers of IPO valuation—country of origin effects, 
corporate governance, and market choice—impact foreign IPO performance.  
Scholars have focused upon uncovering a range of characteristics associated with the IPO 
firm that managers employ to convey its value to potential investors at IPO (e.g., Certo et al., 
2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  Sending the right signals is 
particularly important to managers of foreign private firms because these firms suffer from both 
“liabilities of newness,” and “liability of foreignness”.  We extend extant research that 
predominantly centers upon domestic IPOs listing on local exchanges to argue that one factor 
that impacts the success of new equity issues of foreign firms relates to the legal environment 
surrounding these organizations at home.  The important functions of a legal system include 
holding managers accountable to shareholders, ensuring shareholder voting privilege, preventing 
self-dealing by managers, and protecting creditors.  In order for external investors to provide 
financing to unproven organizations in institutionally distant countries, legal protection must be 
accessible.  For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksmimovic (1998) found greater respect for the 
 6
law leads to greater use of external finance for firms.  Building on these arguments, we find 
“country-of-origin” effects associated with home country investor protection levels impact the 
performance of foreign IPOs to such an extent that strategic considerations in governance and 
capital market choice is necessary.   
Considerable research has explored the effects corporate governance has on corporate 
investment, cost of funds, and company growth.  In fact, a recent McKinsey survey of more than 
200 institutional investors who hold accounts worldwide revealed that their decision to invest is 
largely determined by the governance structure of a firm (Coombes and Watson, 2000).  Citing 
board practices as a critical concern, a majority of these institutional investors indicated that a 
well governed firm would prompt them to pay a premium over a comparable firm that had lower 
governance measures (Gillan and Starks, 2003).  In a separate study, Useem, Bowman, Myatt 
and Irvine (1993) pointed out that an independent board that also had a diverse set of skills and 
experiences was considered important to investors.  However, until the current study, the 
relationship between board independence and the success of foreign IPOs had yet to be 
empirically tested.  
Despite the importance of both home country and internal governance signals, the 
institutional context in which these signals are received may impact their salience with potential 
investors.  This paper builds on comparative governance and institutional theories to contrast the 
impact of corporate governance on performance of foreign IPOs in the UK and the USA.  While 
belonging to the same common law family of corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1997), these 
two countries have followed distinctively different paths in terms of corporate governance 
regulation.  In fact, the U.S. approach has been to develop regulatory mechanisms in the fields of 
corporate and securities law.  On the other hand, U.K. investors and corporate actors have 
proposed voluntary codes as an alternative to law (Aguillera, Filatotchev, Jackson and Gospel, 
2008).  The importance of country of origin and corporate governance signals of foreign firms 
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reveals how investors respond to foreign IPO firms and heightens the need to examine signals in 
multiple institutional contexts.  
 Utilizing a sample of foreign IPOs in which the U.S. or U.K represent the first public 
listing for a foreign firm, we integrate signaling research and institutional perspectives to make a 
number of contributions to previous research.  First, we develop theoretical arguments and 
provide empirical evidence that suggest investor protection in the country of origin significantly 
affects performance.  Second, although previous IPO studies recognize potential signaling effects 
of the firm’s governance characteristics (Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; 
Sanders and Boivie, 2004), there is very little research on corporate governance effects on 
performance of foreign IPOs.  By focusing on the signaling role of board independence, we 
attempt to close this conceptual and empirical gap.  Finally, we extend prior studies by 
recognizing that up this point the impact of corporate governance on IPO performance is limited 
to single institutional settings.  Scholars tend to treat signaling framework as a universal theory 
that will be applied exactly the same in different institutional environments.  Yet, it is reasonable 
to expect that signaling theory should be applied from a finer-grained perspective that makes 
adaptations based on the institutional setting.  Therefore a conceptual contribution of this study 
includes the integration of institutional and signaling theories.  
More specifically, we explore two- and three-way interactive effects of board independence, host 
country, and country-of-origin effects.  This approach also controls for many other explanatory 
variables utilized in previous research, while examining the role that differences in institutional 
environments and regulatory approaches play on the inter-relationships between corporate 
governance and performance.   
3. Theory and hypothesis 
 
3.1. Signaling theory and foreign IPO performance 
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Signaling theory describes the methods investors may use in situations of information 
asymmetry (Spence, 1973) and is consistent with the notion that insiders of an IPO hold more 
information than outsiders.  Researchers have looked at a wide assortment of organizational, and 
extra-organizational attributes that serve as important cues regarding the quality of a firm at IPO 
and lessen the likelihood managers would need to reduce the offer price in order to attract 
investors (e.g., Beatty, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Ritter, 2003).  Governance 
characteristics are a particularly potent signal that investors consider when making decisions 
about the firm’s ability to deal with information asymmetries and associated agency costs (e.g., 
Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  We extend this 
strand of research further by suggesting that firm-level governance signals should be considered 
in conjunction with institutional environments of the IPO’s firm home and host countries.  In the 
subsequent sections we develop these arguments further and suggest testable hypotheses. 
3.1.1. Legal protection  
Unlike other types of IPO signals which emanate from the firm itself or through third 
party affiliations, a foreign IPO firm’s country of origin represents a unique extra-organizational 
signal.  Issues surrounding a firm’s country of origin may work to enhance investor uncertainties 
regarding the safety and security of their investments.  For many years, finance authors have 
pointed to the benefits that cross-border diversification can bring to equity portfolios (Grubel, 
1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974; Grauer and Hakansson, 1987; Eldor, Pines, and 
Schwartz, 1988; DeSantis and Gerard 1997; among others).  Yet despite the benefits, research 
has also shown that investors do not always exploit such international diversification 
opportunities.  Instead, investors tend to allocate a relatively large fraction of their wealth to 
domestic equities, a phenomenon commonly called the “home bias” (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; 
Tesar and Werner, 1995).  While there is an array of potential country-related risks, finance 
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researchers often cite unstable regulatory and legal environments as a significant deterrent to 
foreign investment.  
While investors are accustomed to the legal environment surrounding Western firms, they 
tend to be more apprehensive in the security of investments in foreign firms.  Studies show that 
the legal protection afforded to outside investors has a significant bearing on the size, value, and 
liquidity of a nation’s capital markets.  La Porta, et al. (1998, 1999) found that while common-
law countries tend to grant the best legal protection to investors, French civil law countries grant 
the weakest protection.  Others have also endeavored to examine the support that a country’s 
legal environment provides organizations seeking additional resources.  Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) utilize the International Company Risk Guide’s Law and Order indicators of 
the effectiveness of a country’s legal system rather than those employed by La Porta, et al. 
(1998, 1999) to show that countries with appropriate legal systems offer greater protection of 
long-term external financing and are able to grow faster.  Scholars have observed that Anglo-
Saxon legal systems do appear to provide stronger protection for shareholder rights (Coffee, 
2002), and that financing activity is significantly reduced in countries with poor investor 
protection systems.  Subsequent research lends support to these observations (Lins, Strickland 
and Zenner, 2004; Reese and Weisbach, 2002).  
Because of the uncertainty surrounding a foreign IPO, the strength of a home country’s 
legal environment may have a significant bearing on the success of foreign firms at IPO.  Some 
legal scholars suggest foreign firms that engage in the process of listing on U.S. stock exchanges 
commit themselves to respect minority investor rights and to provide fuller disclosure (Coffee, 
2002).  However, the legal environment surrounding foreign new issues is especially salient to 
investors in the U.S. and U.K. markets because it relates not only to minority investor rights, but 
also in the ability of investors to sue and enforce a legal judgment to recover all or a sizable 
portion of their investments.  Even if a U.S. investor was successful in bringing a lawsuit against 
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a firm domiciled in a foreign country, enforcement of judgments may be difficult if not 
impossible.  Western courts generally do not have jurisdiction over foreign defendants; thus, 
foreign courts often do not recognize judgments of Western courts for liabilities grounded in 
U.S. or U.K. securities laws.  Therefore, the only protection available to Western investors of 
foreign firms may be whatever legal remedies are available in the issuer’s home country.  In 
some cases, these legal remedies may be very similar to those of Western investors, and 
investors may feel more at ease in backing riskier investments in firms originating from these 
countries.  Alternatively, the legal remedies against firms domiciled within emerging economies 
may be limited to such an extent that Western investors may be hesitant to invest in firms which 
originate from these markets.  Thus, we expect IPOs from countries with higher levels of 
investor protection to perform better in Western capital markets.  Formally stated,  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between investor protection in the country 




3.1.2. Board independence 
In a recent survey, Gillan and Starks (2003) revealed that institutional investors 
considered corporate governance practices at least as important as financial performance when 
evaluating new issues.  In fact, a majority of respondents revealed that a well governed firm 
would prompt them to pay a premium over a comparable firm that had lower governance 
measures.  Board independence is considered important to investors because of the diverse set of 
skills and experiences of members (Useem, Bowman, Myatt, and Irvine; 1993) and because it 
provides an important cue to outsiders that the firm will be better governed and capable of 
attaining higher performance levels (Millestein and MacAvoy, 1998).  
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In light of the weight investors place in well governed firms coupled with information 
asymmetry of foreign listings, foreign IPOs with independent boards should be associated with 
high levels of performance in their equity offers.  Certainly, foreign private firm managers have a 
variety of governance changes they could choose from in their effort to heighten investor 
interest.  However, board independence is arguably the most effective governance change a 
foreign IPO could undertake because it clearly indicates to outsiders the willingness of managers 
to adhere to heightened governance standards.  An independent board signals a governance 
structure which Western investors have grown accustomed to and may even expect when 
evaluating unfamiliar foreign firms attempting to raise equity capital.  There is empirical 
evidence suggesting that investors pay a premium when the firm has an independent board (IRB, 
2000).  Thus, we expect higher levels of board independence to be associated with higher levels 
of foreign IPO performance.  We state this formally as: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is positive relationship between the level of board independence and 
foreign IPO performance.   
 
 3.1.3. Interactive effects of board independence and investor protection 
 Previous arguments suggest that “country-of-origin” effects and board independence may 
be powerful governance-related signals that affect foreign IPO firm’s performance.  However, 
these signals are not mutually independent, and they may complement each other.  For instance, 
Ang and Brau (2003) suggest that an IPO allows multiple signals, making a confounding strategy 
possible.  Previous research has found that strategic actions such as increasing the level of 
international operations and board insider ownership effectively mitigate the effect of negative 
country of origin signals when going public (Bell et al., 2008).  As a result, the IPO firm is 
involved in a complex process of evaluating the costs and benefits of various signaling 
mechanisms in search of an optimal combination that minimizes both information asymmetry 
and costs of signaling (Titman and Trueman, 1986).  One strategic action that foreign IPOs can 
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take to mitigate negative country of origin effects is to increase board independence levels.  In 
fact, board independence may suggest to potential investors the managers of a foreign IPO firm 
is attempting to increase its level of transparency and monitoring by adhering to a more 
demanding corporate governance system than the accepted model espoused in its home market.  
Thus, governance signals should interact with country of origin signals and significantly predict 
foreign IPO valuation.  Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The level of board independence positively moderates the relationship between 
investor protection and foreign IPO performance. 
 
 
3.2 Market of listing and regulatory trade-offs 
 
 Our previous discussion is focused on potential signaling effects of the IPO firm’s 
country of origin and board characteristics on its valuation.  However, these effects may be also 
contingent on the IPO firm’s selection of its listing market. 
A major theme in the “law and finance” literature in recent years has been the importance 
of legal origins in determining cross-national differences in corporate governance (La Porta et 
al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000).  While the legal origins approach allows for variation within the 
group of civil law countries, less attention has been paid to differences within the Anglo-Saxon 
group of common law countries.  Common law countries use similar types of law, yet substantial 
variation exists in terms of corporate governance regulatory traditions.   
The U.K. has long tended to supplement legal regulation with a strong tradition of 
voluntary self-regulation in areas related to listing, takeovers, and accounting.  In recent years, this 
tradition has advanced through the development of a set of codes for corporate governance, which 
have culminated in the Combined Code.  This system established corporate governance guidelines, 
yet compliance with the U.K. “Code of Best Practice” is not mandatory.  Firms are free to not 
comply as long as an explanation is provided for any deviation.  Supporters of comply-or-explain 
systems contend they are built upon the concept of principles, rather than strict regulation 
 13
(Hubbard and Thornton, 2006), allowing firms the ability to modify and adapt their corporate 
governance policies to their particular needs.  
The U.K. tradition contrasts with that of the U.S. which developed a more extensive body 
of securities and corporate law at both Federal and State level beginning from the inter-war 
years.  The most recent manifestation of the “hard law” approach was the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 in which the U.S. Congress mandated new and more 
stringent governance regulations and increased the costs of non-compliance to all public firms, 
both foreign and domestic.  While SOX is just one legislative effort which mandated governance 
and heightened transparency of public firms in the U.S., it is indicative of the coercive regulative 
environment found in the U.S.   
Bearing in mind these differences in regulatory approaches in the U.S. and U.K., we 
argue that the foreign IPO firm’s performance will be affected by institutional and regulatory 
traditions not only in its country of origin but also in its chosen country of listing.  Thus, in 
addition to “home country” effects, we suggest “host country” effects may also impact the inter-
relationships between firm-level parameters and performance.  More specifically, we argue that 
corporate governance regulation within a host country may have an impact on the salience of 
foreign IPO signals and possible confounding effects that, in turn, affect performance.  
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, the playing field for new issues in New 
York may be somewhat more level than that of its London counterpart.  Once a foreign IPO has 
met the stringent transparency and listing standards of the SEC and New York exchanges, 
individual signals associated with a new foreign issue’s legal environment as well as its 
governance structures may become less salient to investors evaluating their participation levels in 
a foreign new issue.  Alternatively, in London, legal protection levels, as well as board 
independence, should prove especially important to first day investors because the LSE and AIM 
listing standards are considerably less stringent than their New York counterparts.  Since the 
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U.K. regulatory environment is based on a comply-or-explain principle, it is reasonable to 
believe that investors may put a premium on IPOs with more robust governance systems and 
firms coming from countries with higher governance standards and legal protection of minority 
investors.  
In addition, Aguillera et al. (2008) emphasize that governance attributes impose 
monitoring costs on firms.  More specifically, in their discussion of signaling effects of 
governance factors in IPO firms, Sanders and Boivie (2004) argue that an increase in the 
marginal costs of monitoring may more than offset the reduction in investor uncertainty.  These 
arguments are consistent with more recent research that suggests that investors may be 
concerned with “over-regulation” of firms.  For example, Claessens et al. (2007) provide 
evidence that the stock-market performance of firms with higher individual Institutional 
Shareholder Service (ISS) corporate governance scores is relatively lower in countries with high 
governance standards compared to well-governed firms in countries with lower standards.  They 
argue that investors may consider a combination of stringent internal governance and high 
national governance standards as too excessive to the extent that investors put a discount on this 
specific population of firms. Building on the signal salience and over-regulation arguments, we 
suggest the following two-way interaction effects:  
Hypothesis 4a: The relationship between investor protection and performance of foreign IPOs is 
negative for listings in the U.S.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The relationship between board independence and performance of foreign IPOs 
is negative for listings in the U.S.  
 
 
Finally, a number of studies suggest viewing corporate governance as a system of inter-
related elements having strategic and institutional complementarities (Aoki, 2001; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1994; 1995).  Some authors have recognized that governance mechanisms operate 
interdependently, with the overall effectiveness depending on a simultaneous operation of 
several mechanisms in limiting managerial opportunism and strategic errors (Rediker and Seth, 
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1995; Walsh and Seward, 1990).  A more recently developed set-theoretic approach to 
organizations suggests that for individual firms, corporate control involves different sets of 
practices that need to operate as a whole in order to be effective (Fiss, 2007).  Since alternative 
control mechanisms exist, greater use of one mechanism need not to be positively related to firm 
performance.  Similarly, where one specific mechanism is used less, others may be used more, 
resulting in equally good performance (Agrawal and Knoweber, 1996).  Different governance 
mechanisms can operate in concert, and the cost-benefit trade-offs among a variety of 
governance mechanisms would determine their use.  Therefore, investors may evaluate their 
participation levels in foreign IPOs less upon individual signals and more on the unique bundle 
of signals surrounding a foreign IPO.  Our arguments suggest that this bundle includes not only 
focal firm’s corporate governance but also country-of-origin and host country effects.  Once a 
foreign IPO has met the stringent transparency and listing standards of the New York exchanges, 
individual signals associated with a new foreign issue’s legal environment at home and its 
governance structures may become less important to investors evaluating a new foreign issue.  In 
this sense, both legal protection and board independence levels would have a stronger interactive 
effect among those firms that choose to list in London compared to on U.S. exchanges.  In 
addition, a combination of high legal protection at home, board independence and listing in the 
US may create the “over-regulation” effect outlined above.  These arguments suggest a three-
way inter-relationship between the foreign IPO firm’s home legal protection, its board 
independence, and its choice of a listing market.  Hence, 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a three-way interaction between investor protection, board independence 
and choice of listing market in explaining performance of foreign IPOs: when investor protection 
and board independence are both high, listing in the U.S. has negative relationship with 
performance of foreign IPOs. 
 
4. Research method 
4.1. Design and sample 
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This study is based upon a hand-selected sample of foreign private firms making their 
initial public equity offers on U.S. or U.K. exchanges. We began by utilizing Thomson 
Financial’s Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database to identify all foreign firms 
that made initial public offerings in the U.S market, as well as those that made first initial public 
offerings in the U.K market between 2002 and 2007.  This sample period was chosen as it 
reflects the time period after the governance provisions specified within Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation went into effect for U.S. new issues.  We classified “foreign” in both the U.S. and 
U.K samples to be those companies incorporated and whose primary executive offices are 
located outside of the U.S., for the U.S. sample, and outside the U.K. for the U.K. sample.  
Consistent with prior IPO research conducted upon domestic samples, firms excluded from both 
the U.S. and U.K. samples were stock listings resulting from mergers or acquisitions, as well as 
from spin-offs of publicly-listed firms.  In addition, units, warrants and rights offerings were 
excluded from analysis.  We also followed selection procedures outlined by Bruner et al., (2006) 
by removing all new issues of foreign utility firms from consideration.  Finally, we eliminated 
from consideration U.S. or London financial services incorporated in Bermuda, Bahamas, or the 
Cayman Islands.  These firms often choose to incorporate in these countries for tax purposes 
alone.  After identifying the sample of foreign IPOs made on U.S. and U.K. exchanges between 
2002 and 2007, we then referred to each offering firm’s prospectus to acquire our governance 
and control variables.  Our final sample includes 103 and 99 foreign IPOs in the U.S. and U.K., 
respectively. 
4.2. Variables 
We utilized IPO Success (Gulati and Higgins, 2003) as our dependent variable.  Previous 
research in finance and strategic management fields has generated a number of proxies for IPO 
performance, including underpricing (e.g., difference between offer and first day of trading 
prices), offer price-to-sales, and offer price-to-assets ratios.  However, these proxies have been 
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criticized for over-restrictive underlying assumptions, such as an ability of first-day traders to 
obtain full information about the quality of IPO firms (see Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008, for a 
discussion).  Instead, we employ a compound measurement of IPO performance suggested in 
more recent research (Gulati and Higgins, 2003).  IPO Success is a composite measure of four 
separate financial measures: net proceeds of the IPO offering, pre-money market valuation, the 
90-day post-IPO market valuation, and 180-day post-IPO valuation.  This measurement 
combines both the short-term and longer-term proxies of IPO stock market performance, and not 
based on restrictive assumptions about the stock market participants described above. 
Investor protection is commonly defined as the protection of outside investors by the 
enforcement of regulations and laws (La Porta et al. 2000; Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  La 
Porta et al. (2000) first suggested that investors rights are protected when investors receive 
dividends on pro-rata terms, are allowed to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders’ 
meeting, to subscribe to new issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, and to sue 
directors or the majority for suspected expropriation.  Investors who do not have these powers 
are susceptible to the possibility that insiders can unfairly appropriate a firm’s profits.  Following 
Defond and Hung (2004) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), we measure the strength of a 
country’s law enforcement institutions using the mean score of three law enforcement variables 
identified by La Porta et al. (1998): 1. the efficiency of a country’s judicial system, 2. tradition of 
law and order within a country 3. extent of government corruption.  La Porta’s index ranges from 
0 to 6, with higher scores representing stronger law enforcement institutions.  We utilize these 
proxies to assess investor protection levels in the countries represented in this study.  
Board independence was measured as the ratio of independent directors to total board 
size (Carpenter et al., 2003; Certo et al., 2001).  In order to capture director independences, our 
board composition measure classifies independent (non-management) directors as only those 
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with no prior professional or personal tie to the company or to management.  This information 
was collected from the offering prospectuses. 
 Market choice indicated the firm’s market of listing: Non-U.S. IPOs that listed on U.S. 
exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) were coded as 1, and while those foreign firms that listed on 
UK exchanges (LSE and AIM) were coded as 0.  
 Following previous research, we controlled for the effects of firm size, age, and industry 
as well as a host of other firm related factors which could impact their success at initial offering. 
Firm size was accounted for by accounting for the revenues at the time of IPO (Sanders and 
Boivie, 2004).  Firm age was operationalized by taking the difference in years between the IPO 
firm’s founding date and the date of the IPO (Daily, Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya, 2003).  We 
controlled for the effect that prestigious underwriters may have on the success of foreign firms at 
IPO by utilizing the Carter and Manaster (1990) index.  Following Daily et al. (2005), we 
controlled for industry effects using a dichotomous variable indicating whether the IPO operates 
in a high-tech industry or not.  Firms identified as operating in high technology industry sectors 
were coded as 1, while those in low-technology industry sectors were coded as 0.  We also 
controlled for foreign IPOs that were shipping or mining firms because these firms tended to 
have 100% international assets.  In addition, consistent with prior research, we summed the 
number of risk factors listed in a foreign firm’s prospectus to provide an overall level of foreign 
IPO firm risk at the time of the IPO (Welbourne and Andrews 1996; Certo et al. 2001).  Previous 
studies indicate that firms with larger boards can be beneficial to experience better performance 
IPO (Certo et al. 2001; Daily, et al.., 2003).  We summed the number of individuals serving as 
directors on the board to account for board size.  Finally, research suggests that the size of a 
company’s top management team (TMT) can affect cognitive differences, social integration, and 
consensus (Lester, et al., 2006).  Similar to the rationale for controlling for board size, investors 
may look favorably upon distant and otherwise unknown companies with a large TMT.  
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Following Carpenter et al. (2003) we measured TMT size by summing all individuals identified 
in each offering prospectus as key company executives.  
5. Analyses and results  
Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 1.  Based on the correlation 
matrix, there are minimal levels of multicollinearity between independent variables.  Only the 
correlations of the U.S. IPO indicator variable with firm risk and underwriter prestige have high 
degrees of correlation.  We examined models with firm risk and underwriter prestige auditor 
reputation removed and found no change in the interpretation of the results.  Moreover, the 
variance inflation factor values of all variables in Table 2 range from 1.03—2.17, which suggests 
a lack of multicollinearity before including the interaction terms (Neter, Wasserman, and Kunter 
1990).   
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In order to examine the direct relationship between investor protection and IPO success 
(H1), we performed a hierarchical regression analysis that initially controls for generally 
accepted predictors of IPO performance.  Our various control variables are in the direction we 
would theoretically expect (see Model 1 in Table 2) and tend to significantly relate to IPO 
success (R2=21.3%).  The regression results of Model 2 in Table 2 provide empirical support for 
the direct effects of investor protection on IPO success (H1), while controlling for other effects.  
We find a positive relationship between investor protection and IPO success (β=0.122, p<0.01).  
Thus, we find support for the direct relationship between country of origin effect (i.e., investor 
protection) and firm performance hypothesized in H1.  This addition increased the explained 
variance in IPO Success (ΔR2 = .017, p<0.001).  Our second hypothesis argued for a positive 
relationship between board independence and IPO success (H2).  This addition increased the 
explained variance in IPO Success (ΔR2 = .011, p<0.001).  Contrary to H2, Model 3 in Table 2 
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finds a significant, negative relationship between board independence (β=-0.037, p<0.05).  
Interestingly, board independence appears to be a significant cost when considering the longer-
term performance implications after the firm has gone public.   
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In order to further examine the inter-relationships between variables, we conducted 
hierarchical moderated regression to verify two-way interactions described in hypotheses 3, 4a, 
and 4b.  We centered all moderating variables on their respective means as suggested by Aiken 
and West (1991) to remove the inherent multicollinearity between predictor variables and 
interaction terms that include these predictors.  After performing these steps, we find support for 
our third hypothesis, which examines the moderating effect that board independence has on 
investor protection’s relationship with IPO success (H3).  In Model 4 of Table 2 (H3), board 
independence was found to positively moderate the relationship between investor protection and 
IPO success (β=0.061, p<0.05).  This addition increased the explained variance in IPO Success 
(ΔR2 = .033, p<0.001).  Thus, we find support for our third hypothesis such that high board 
independence increases the positive relationship between investor protection and IPO success.  
We further analyzed the interaction by performing a simple slope analysis (Aiken and West, 
1991) for each regression line to test whether its slope was significantly different from zero. In 
support of Hypothesis 3, we find that the relationship between investor protection and IPO 
success is significantly positive when board independence is high (b=0.24, p<0.01).  
Additionally, we have plotted the interaction in Figure 1.  This Figure shows that high levels of 
board independence increase IPO Success more than low levels of board independence for IPOs 
from countries with high to moderate levels of investor protection.  With the broad-term measure 
of performance (IPO success), high board independence has a steeper slope as investor 
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protection increases.  Based on this figure, board independence increases firm performance, but 
has a more pronounced effect for IPOs coming from countries where investor protection is high.   
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In H4a, we argued that investor protection would have differential effects on IPO success 
for the U.S. versus the U.K. market. In Model 5 of Table 2, we found a significant difference in 
IPO success (β=-0.052, p<0.05) based on the market chosen by the firm.  This addition increased 
the explained variance in IPO Success (ΔR2 = .087, p<0.001).  In order to further validate the 
moderating effects, we have plotted the interactions in Figure 2 for IPO success, where we find 
that the positive slope for the curve representing the U.K. market is steeper than that of the U.S. 
market.  We also find that the slope of the line representing the relationship between investor 
protection and IPO success in the U.S. (b=0.03, p<0.10) and the U.K. (b=0.09, p<0.05) is 
significantly different from zero.  In all, these results show considerable moderation by taking 
into account the choice of market when examining the effect that investor protection has on firm 
performance.  While higher levels of investor protection result in increased performance for both 
markets, the effect is more pronounced in the UK.  The data suggest that UK investors value 
IPOs from countries with moderate to high levels of investor protection higher than U.S. 
investors. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In H4b, we made the argument that the relationship between board independence and IPO 
success would differ in the U.S. and U.K. markets.  In Model 6 of Table 2, we found further 
evidence that market choice moderated the relationship between board independence and IPO 
success (β=-0.028, p<0.05), in line with Hypothesis 4b.  This addition increased the explained 
variance in IPO Success (ΔR2 = .067, p<0.001).  However, we find in Figure 3 that board 
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independence appears to have decreasing returns in both the U.K. and U.S. markets, although the 
slope in the U.S. is significantly steeper that in the U.K. (b = -0.08, p<0.05).   
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Finally, in H5 we hypothesized a three-way interaction between investor protection, 
board independence, and listing in the U.S. for explaining performance of foreign IPOs.  We 
argued when investor protection and board independence are both high, listing in the U.S has 
negative relationship with the performance of foreign IPOs.  The results of our analysis are 
contained in Model 7 of Table 2.  We find consistent evidence of a three-way interaction 
between investor protection, board independence, and market choice for IPO Success (β=-0.149, 
p<0.01).  The full model significantly explains 32.3% of the variance in IPO Success (p<0.01).  
In absolute terms and based on the regression coefficient, when investor protection and board 
independence are both high, listing in the U.S. has negative relationship with performance of 
foreign IPOs as predicted in Hypothesis 5. 
 In order to further validate three-way interaction results, we have plotted the interaction 
in Figure 4.  Based on face validity, we find that when we compare board independence and 
investor protection, the market choice for the IPO is an important predictor of success.  The 
graphs show that high board independence has differential effects in the U.S. and U.K. markets, 
such that high board independence appears to be valued higher in the U.K. than U.S., which is in 
support of Hypothesis 5.  We performed a significance test for slope differences (Dawson and 
Richter 2006) for each regression line in Figure 4.  The analysis supports our prediction that the 
relationship between investor protection, board independence, and IPO success was different in 
the U.S. and U.K. markets.  We find that the slope for firms with high levels of board 
independence that are from countries with high levels of investor protection that list in the U.S. 
are significantly different from those that list in U.K. (b= 1.99, p<0.05).   
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By using a unique, hand-collected matched sample of IPOs in the U.S. and U.K., we 
integrate institutional and signaling theory to contrast corporate governance effects in two 
common law countries.  Our results generally provide support for the relationships hypothesized 
in the paper.  This study has several implications for research and practice. In line with signaling 
research (Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002) our analysis suggests that IPO firms 
can reduce agency problems, uncertainty and associated costs of capital by adopting attributes 
and actions that may signal their quality to external investors. We show that board independence 
of the foreign IPO firms is considered by investors as a value-enhancing signal that positively 
affects IPO valuation. In their research on signaling through governance, Sanders and Boivie 
(2004) emphasize that even when such attributes impose monitoring costs on firms, the reduction 
in investor uncertainty may more than offset the marginal costs of monitoring. However, our 
paper also suggests a more complex picture and shows that the foreign IPO firm may be 
associated with a number of signaling mechanisms, in addition to its governance characteristics. 
More specifically, its country of origin and choice of country of listing may be used as other 
signaling factors and, as a result, the IPO firm is involved in a complex process of evaluating 
costs and benefits of various signaling mechanisms in search of an optimal combination that 
minimizes both information asymmetry and costs of signaling (Titman and Trueman, 1986). Ang 
and Brau (2003), for example, suggest that an IPO allows multiple signals, including positive 
signals, making the confounding strategy possible. Therefore, our study provides a contribution 
to previous research by focusing on a “bundle” of IPO signals associated with firm 
characteristics and its institutional environments both at home and abroad. 
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We show that recognition of the heterogeneity of governance regulatory mechanisms may 
be especially important in different institutional contexts.  Specifically, national institutional 
differences can moderate the links between firm-level governance factors and performance.  
Although we expected a positive effect of increased board independence on IPO success, we 
found the relationship between board independence and IPO performance appears to be 
contingent upon the firm’s market choice and home country investor protection.  From Figure 1, 
we find that board independence does in fact benefit firms from countries with lower levels of 
investor protection, which suggests board independence substitutes for a lack of investor 
protection in the foreign IPO’s country of origin when don’t consider the market choice of the 
IPO.  However, Figure 4 allows us to compare all three variables (i.e., investor protection, board 
independence, and market choice) simultaneously and suggests board independence is most 
valuable for IPOs from countries with high levels of investor protection that choose to list in the 
U.K.  Thus, unlike much of the prior research that has focused on mature firms in North 
America, this research clearly shows that board independence and investor protection can have a 
significant effect on performance, but that national institutional setting may affect the relative 
significance of that impact. Independent directors play an important signaling role in the U.K. 
where “comply-or-explain” regulatory practices prevail. Our results confirm that governance 
mechanisms that reduce agency concerns are contingent on country of origin.  Furthermore, 
these effects showed considerable differences when we also take into account the international 
choice of market for the foreign IPO.   
The research also makes methodological advances in examining board- and investor 
protection-related effects on performance of newly listed firms.  Prior research has focused on 
mature firms with highly dispersed ownership.  Instead this research examines the context of IPO 
firms which have very short previous history of governance development.  This approach has 
 25
allowed an examination of firms in a setting with fewer confounding variables and with a clearer 
focus on the role of corporate governance. 
6.1 Limitations and future research  
This study has a number of limitations that suggest areas for further research.  First, we 
limited our focus of governance factors to board independence and did not discuss other 
governance factors such as ownership structure and the role of the CEO/Founder.  Second, in 
line with many other IPO papers, our study focused only on a cross-sectional design to examine 
predictors of stock-market performance.  Longitudinal data is needed to explore the longer-term 
post-IPO effects of ownership patterns on performance.  Third, while we have examined the 
distinction between regulatory regimes in the two countries, there are some other differences in 
the institutional infrastructure of IPO markets in the U.S. and U.K.  More fine-grained analysis is 
needed to analyze these aspects of corporate governance. 
Our findings indicate a rich set of future research possibilities.  For example, the findings 
suggest that agency problems may be different in different national settings.  This implies that 
the agency framework should be integrated with institutional analysis to generate robust 
predictions.  Future research should expand on this concept further and seek to more explicitly 
examine agency theory and its implications when different institutional settings are involved 
(Aguilera et al., 2008).  For example, this research contrasted U.K. and U.S., two common law 
countries. However, there is also a civil law tradition in Germany and France and a distinctive 
Scandinavian legal environment (La Porta et al., 1998).  Do these institutional environments also 
have a significant impact on signaling properties of IPO firms?  For example, investor protection 
in German civil law is generally seen as less than in common law but more than in French civil 
law.  Therefore, is the impact of German civil law somewhere between the other two legal 
environments?  
7. Conclusions  
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Because of the growth in foreign firms seeking equity capital on U.S. and London stock 
exchanges, direct foreign initial offerings have emerged as a new stream of research with a small 
but growing number of studies (Bell et al, 2008; Hursti and Maula, 2007; Bruner, Chaplinsky 
and Ramchand, 2006; Kadiyala and Subrahmanyam, 2002; Ejara, Ghosh, and Nunn, 1999). This 
research has provided a strong indication that board independence and “country of origin” effects 
can be powerful signals, these factors do not have a universal impact on IPO performance.  
Instead, they can be of great use in some “host country” settings.  Future research should build 
on these findings to seek to better determine the exact nature of those settings where there can be 





Agrawal, A., Knoeber, C., 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(3), 
377-395. 
 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R.M., Williamson, R.G., 2007. Do U.S. firms have the best 
corporate governance? A cross-country examination of the relation between corporate 
governance and shareholder wealth. Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2006-03-
006. 
 
Aguilera, R., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H., Jackson, G., 2008. An organizational approach to 
comparative corporate governance: costs, contingencies and complementarities. Organization 
Science, forthcoming. 
 
Aiken L.S., West S.G., 1991. Multiple Regression:  Testing and Interpreting Interactions. Sage: 
Newbury Park, CA. 
 
Ang, J.S., Brau, J.C., 2003. Concealing and confounding adverse signals: insider wealth-
maximizing behavior in the IPO process. Journal of Financial Economics 67, 149-172. 
 
Aoki, M., 2001. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
 
Beatty. R., 1989. Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. The Accounting 
Review 64, 693-709. 
 
Bell, R.G., Moore, C., Al-Shammari, H., 2008. Country of origin and foreign IPO legitimacy:  
Understanding the role of geographic scope and insider ownership. Entrepreneurship:  
Theory and Practice 31(1), 185-202. 
 
Bruner, R., Chaplinsky, S., Ramchand, L., 2006. Coming to America: IPOs from emerging 
market issuers. Emerging Markets Review 7(3), 191-212. 
 
Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A., 1986. Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: New 
imperialism, 1850-1945. Economic History Review  40, 1-26. 
 
Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A., 1993. British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914, and 
British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990. London, Longman. 
 
Carpenter, M.A., Pollock, T.G., Leary, M.M., 2003. Testing a model of reasoned risk- taking: 
Governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high-technology 
IPO Firms. Strategic Management Journal 24, 803-820. 
 
Carter, R.B., Manaster, S., 1990. Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. Journal of 
Finance 65, 1045-1067.  
 
Certo, S.T., Covin, J.G., Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R., 2001. Wealth and the effects of founder 
management among IPO-stage new ventures. Strategic Management Journal 22, 641-658.  
 
 28
Chahine, S., and Filatotchev, I. 2008. “Signalling the firm’s value”: information disclosure, 
corporate governance and performance of IPOs”. Journal of Small Business Management, 
forthcoming. 
 
Chemmanur, T.J. Fulghieri, P., 2006. Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory 
of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards. Journal of Financial Economics 82, 455-
489.  
 
Claessens, S., Bruno, V., 2007. Corporate governance and regulation: can there be too much of a 
good thing? World Bank Working Paper 4140. 
 
Coffee, J.C., 2002. Racing towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock market 
competition on international corporate governance. Columbia Law Review 102, 1757-75. 
 
Coombes, P., Watson, M., 2000. Three surveys on corporate governance. The McKinsey 
Quarterly Special Ed. 4:74-77. 
 
Daily, C., Certo, S., Dalton, D., Roengpitya, R. 2003. IPO underpricing: A meta-analysis and 
research synthesis. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 27, 271-295. 
 
Daily, C., Certo, S., Dalton, D., 2005. Investment bankers and IPO pricing: does prospectus 
information matter? Journal of Business Venturing 20, 93 – 112. 
 
Davenport, K.A., Dolan, M.F., Hayashi, Y. 2006. A primer for non-US issuers. International 
Financial Law Review 25, 59-70. 
 
Dawson, J.F., Richter, A.W., 2006. Probing three-way interactions in moderated multiple 
regression: Development and application of a slope difference test. Journal of Applied 
Psychology 91(4), 917-926. 
 
DeFond, M.L., Hung, M., 2004. Investor protection and corporate governance: evidence from 
worldwide CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research 42, 269–312. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 1998. Law, finance and firm growth. Journal of Finance 
53, 2107-2139. 
 
DeSantis, G., Gerard, B., 1997. International asset pricing and portfolio diversification with 
time-varying risk. Journal of Finance 52, 1881-1912. 
 
Eldor, R., Pines, D., Schwartz, A., 1988. Home asset preference and productivity shocks. Journal 
of International Economics 25, 165–76. 
 
Ejara, D.D., Ghosh, C., Nunn, K., 1999. IPO underpricing and aftermarket performance: A 
comparison of american depositary receipt (ADRs) IPOs and US IPOs, European Finance 
Association Conference, 25-28th August, Helsinki (Finland). 
 
Filatotchev, I., Bishop, K., 2002. Board composition, share ownership and ‘underpricing’ of 
U.K. IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal 23, 941-955. 
 
 29
Fiss, P.C., 2007. A set-theoretic approach to organizational configurations. Academy of 
Management Review 32(4), 1180–1198.  
 
Gillan, S., Starks, L., 2003. Corporate governance, corporate ownership and the role of 
institutional investors: A global perspective. Journal of Applied Finance 13, 4-22. 
 
Grauer, R.R., Hakansson, N.H., 1987. Gains from international diversification: 1968-85 returns 
on portfolios of stocks and bonds. Journal of Finance 42, 721-739. 
 
Grubel, H.G., 1968. Internationally diversified portfolios. The American Economic Review 58, 
1299-1314. 
 
Gulati, R., and Higgins, M.C., 2003. Which ties matter when? The contingent effects of 
interorganizational partnerships on IPOs success. Strategic Management Journal 24, 127-144. 
 
Hubbard, R.G., Thornton, J.L., 2006. Action plan for capital markets. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 
30: A16.   
 
Hursti, J., Maula, M., 2007. Acquiring financial resources from foreign equity capital markets: 
an examination of factors influencing foreign initial public offerings. Journal of Business 
Venturing 22, 833-851. 
 
Investors Relations Business (IRB), (2000), “Good governance pays off: institutions will pay a 
premium for an independent board”, Staff Reports, Institutional Shareholder Services, 10 
July, pp. 1-3. 
 
Kadiyala, P., Subrahmanyam, A., 2002. Foreign firms issuing equity on US exchanges: an 
empirical investigation of IPOs and SEOs. International Review of Finance 3 (1), 27–51. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, F., Vishny, A., 1997. Legal determinants of external 
finance. Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schleifer, F., Vishny, A., 1998. Law and finance. Journal of 
Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, F., Vishny, A., 1999. The quality of government. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 222-79. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, F., Vishny, A., 2000. Investor protection and 
corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27. 
 
Lester, R.H., Certo, S. T., Dalton, C.M., Dalton, D.R., Cannella, A.A., Jr., 2006. Initial public 
offering investor valuations: An examination of top management team prestige and 
environmental uncertainty. Journal of Small Business Management 44, 1-26. 
 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., Wysocki, P., 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: An 
international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 505–27. 
 
Levy, H., Sarnat, M., 1970. International diversification of investment portfolio[s]. American 
Economic Review 4, 668-675. 
 30
 
Lins, K., Strickland, D., Zenner, M., 2004. Do non-U.S. firms issue equity on U.S. exchanges to 
relax capital constraints? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 109-133. 
 
Milgrom, P.R., Roberts, J., 1994. Complementarities and systems: understanding Japanese 
economic organization. Estudios Economicos 9(1), 3-42. 
 
Milgrom, P.R., Roberts, J., 1995. Complementarities and fit: strategy, structure, and 
organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19(2-3), 179-
208. 
 
Millestein, I.M., MacAvoy, P.W., 1998. The active board of directors and performance of the 
large publicly traded corporation. Columbia Law Journal 98, 1283-1321. 
 
Neter, Wasserman, and Kunter. 1990.  Applied Linear Statistical Models. 3rd edition, Irwin. 
 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 2000. The six major puzzles in international macroeconomics: Is there 
a common cause? NBER/Macroeconomics Annual 15, 339-390. 
 
Rediker, K.J., Seth, A. 1995. Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative 
governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal 16(2), 85-99. 
 
Reese, W.A., Weisbach, M., 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in 
the United States, and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 66, 65–
104. 
 
Ritter, J.R. 2003. Differences between European and American IPO markets. European Financial 
Management 9, 421–34. 
 
Sanders, G.W., Boivie, S., 2004. Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms in uncertain markets. 
Strategic Management Journal 25, 167-186.  
 
Shleifer, A., Wolfenzon, D., 2002. Investor protection and equity markets. Journal of Financial 
Economics 66 (1), 3–27. 
 
Solnik, B. 1974. An equilibrium model of the international capital market. Journal of Economic 
Theory 8, 500-524.  
 
Spence, A. 1973. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 355-379.  
 
Tesar, L., Werner, I., 1995. Home bias and high turnover. Journal of International Money and 
Finance 14, 467-493. 
 
Titman, S., Trueman, B., 1986. Information quality and the valuation of new issues. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 8, 159-172.  
 
Useem, M., Bowman, E.H., Myatt, J., Irvine, C.W., 1993. U.S. institutional investors look at 
corporate governance in the 1990s. European Management Journal 11, 175-189. 
 
 31
Walsh, J.P., Seward, J.K., 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control 
mechanisms. Academy of Management Review 15 (3), 421-458. 
 
Welbourne, T.M., Andrews, A.O., 1996. Predicting the performance of initial public offerings: 
Should human resource management be in the equation? Academy of Management Journal 
39, 891–919. 
 
Zahra, S.A., Filatotchev, I., 2004. Governance of the entrepreneurial threshold firm: A 
knowledge-based perspective. Journal of Management Studies 41, 883-895. 
 
 
 
 
